The original paper used real cards, whereas nowadays, the Iowa Gambling Task is often computer based. The task was originally developed to detect problems patients with damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex.This part of the brain is, among other things, involved in processing risk, fear, emotion, and decision making. Neuropsychology- Executive Function, Lateralization. What is the idea behind Damasio's Iowa Gambling task? Iowa gambling and the learning of new associations environmental control of behavior? Difficulty using information from the environment to regulate and change behavior.

The Iowa gambling task (IGT) is a psychological task thought to simulate real-life decision making.It was introduced by Antoine Bechara, Antonio Damasio, Hanna Damasio and Steven Anderson,^[1] then researchers at the University of Iowa. It has been brought to popular attention by Antonio Damasio (proponent of the Somatic markers hypothesis) in his best-selling book Descartes' Error.^[2]

The task was originally presented simply as the Gambling Task, or the 'OGT'. Later, it has been referred to as the Iowa gambling task and, less frequently, as Bechara's Gambling Task.^[3] The Iowa gambling task is widely used in research of cognition and emotion. A recent review listed more than 400 papers that made use of this paradigm.^[4]

• 1Task structure

Task structure[edit]

Participants are presented with four virtual decks of cards on a computer screen. They are told that each deck holds cards that will either reward or penalize them, using game money. The goal of the game is to win as much money as possible. The decks differ from each other in the balance of reward versus penalty cards. Thus, some decks are 'bad decks', and other decks are 'good decks', because some decks will tend to reward the player more often than other decks.

Common findings[edit]

Most healthy participants sample cards from each deck, and after about 40 or 50 selections are fairly good at sticking to the good decks. Patients with orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) dysfunction, however, continue to persevere with the bad decks, sometimes even though they know that they are losing money overall. Concurrent measurement of galvanic skin response shows that healthy participants show a 'stress' reaction to hovering over the bad decks after only 10 trials, long before conscious sensation that the decks are bad.^[5] By contrast, patients with amygdala lesions never develop this physiological reaction to impending punishment. In another test, patients with ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) dysfunction were shown to choose outcomes that yield high immediate gains in spite of higher losses in the future.^[6] Bechara and his colleagues explain these findings in terms of the somatic marker hypothesis.

The Iowa gambling task is currently being used by a number of research groups using fMRI to investigate which brain regions are activated by the task in healthy volunteers^[7] as well as clinical groups with conditions such as schizophrenia and obsessive compulsive disorder.

Critiques[edit]

Although the IGT has achieved prominence, it is not without its critics. Criticisms have been raised over both its design and its interpretation. Published critiques include:

• A paper by Dunn, Dalgliesh and Lawrence^[4]
• Research by Lin, Chiu, Lee and Hsieh,^[8] who argue that a common result (the 'prominent deck B' phenomenon) argues against some of the interpretations that the IGT has been claimed to support.
• Research by Chiu and Lin,^[9] the 'sunken deck C' phenomenon was identified, which confirmed a serious confound embedded in the original design of IGT, this confound makes IGT serial studies misinterpret the effect of gain-loss frequency as final-outcome for Somatic marker hypothesis.
• A research group in Taiwan utilized an IGT-modified and relatively symmetrical gamble for gain-loss frequency and long-term outcome, namely the Soochow gambling task (SGT) demonstrated a reverse finding of Iowa gambling task.^[10] Normal decision makers in SGT were mostly occupied by the immediate perspective of gain-loss and inability to hunch the long-term outcome in the standard procedure of IGT (100 trials under uncertainty). In his book, Inside the investor's brain,^[11]Richard L. Peterson considered the serial findings of SGT may be congruent with the Nassim Taleb's^[12] suggestion on some fooled choices in investment.

Iowa Gambling Task Demo

References[edit]

1. ^Bechara, A., Damasio, A. R., Damasio, H., Anderson, S. W. (1994). 'Insensitivity to future consequences following damage to human prefrontal cortex'. Cognition. 50 (1–3): 7–15. doi:10.1016/0010-0277(94)90018-3. PMID8039375.CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
2. ^Damasio, António R. (2008) [1994]. Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain. Random House. ISBN978-1-4070-7206-7.Descartes' Error
3. ^Busemeyer JR, Stout JC (2002). 'A contribution of cognitive decision models to clinical assessment: Decomposing performance on the Bechara gambling task'. Psychological Assessment. 14 (3): 253–262. doi:10.1037/1040-3590.14.3.253.
4. ^ ^abDunn BD, Dalgleish T, Lawrence AD (2006). 'The somatic marker hypothesis: a critical evaluation'. Neurosci Biobehav Rev. 30 (2): 239–71. doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2005.07.001. PMID16197997.
5. ^Bechara A, Damasio H, Tranel D, Damasio AR (1997). 'Deciding advantageously before knowing the advantageous strategy'. Science. 275 (5304): 1293–5. doi:10.1126/science.275.5304.1293. PMID9036851.
6. ^Bechara A, Damasio H, Tranel D, Damasio AR (2000). 'Characterization of the decision-making deficit of patients with ventromedial prefrontal cortex lesions'. Brain. 123 (11): 2189–2202. doi:10.1093/brain/123.11.2189. PMID11050020.
7. ^Fukui H, Murai T, Fukuyama H, Hayashi T, Hanakawa T (2005). 'Functional activity related to risk anticipation during performance of the Iowa Gambling Task'. NeuroImage. 24 (1): 253–9. doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2004.08.028. PMID15588617.
8. ^Lin CH, Chiu YC, Lee PL, Hsieh JC (2007). 'Is deck B a disadvantageous deck in the Iowa Gambling Task?'. Behav Brain Funct. 3: 16. doi:10.1186/1744-9081-3-16. PMC1839101. PMID17362508.
9. ^Chiu, Yao-Chu; Lin, Ching-Hung (August 2007). 'Is deck C an advantageous deck in the Iowa Gambling Task?'. Behavioral and Brain Functions. 3 (1): 37. doi:10.1186/1744-9081-3-37. PMC1995208. PMID17683599.
10. ^Chiu, Yao-Chu; Lin, Ching-Hung; Huang, Jong-Tsun; Lin, Shuyeu; Lee, Po-Lei; Hsieh, Jen-Chuen (March 2008). 'Immediate gain is long-term loss: Are there foresighted decision makers in the Iowa Gambling Task?'. Behavioral and Brain Functions. 4 (1): 13. doi:10.1186/1744-9081-4-13. PMC2324107. PMID18353176.
11. ^Richard L. Peterson (9 July 2007). Inside the Investor's Brain: The Power of Mind Over Money. Wiley. ISBN978-0-470-06737-6.
12. ^'Nassim Nicholas Taleb Home & Professional Page'. www.fooledbyrandomness.com.

External links[edit]

• A free implementation of the Iowa Gambling task is available as part of the PEBL Project. For free, you will need to contribute to the WIKI, financially, software development, or publish and cite the program.
• A customizable version of the web implementation that works with Google Spreadsheets (your own spreadsheet) is here.
• A free implementation for Android and iPad.

Hot cognition is a hypothesis on motivated reasoning in which a person's thinking is influenced by their emotional state. Put simply, hot cognition is cognition coloured by emotion.^[1] Hot cognition contrasts with cold cognition, which implies cognitive processing of information that is independent of emotional involvement.^[2] Hot cognition is proposed to be associated with cognitive and physiological arousal, in which a person is more responsive to environmental factors. As it is automatic, rapid and led by emotion,^[3] hot cognition may consequently cause biased and low-quality decision making.^[4] Hot cognition may arise, with varying degrees of strength, in politics, religion, and other sociopolitical contexts because of moral issues, which are inevitably tied to emotion.^[1] Hot cognition was initially proposed in 1963 by Robert P. Abelson. This idea became popular in the 1960s and the 1970s. An example of a biased decision caused by hot cognition would be a juror disregarding evidence because of an attraction to the defendant.^[1]

Decision making with cold cognition is more likely to involve logic and critical analysis.^[5] Therefore, when an individual engages in a task when displaying cold cognition, the stimuli is likely to be emotionally neutral and the 'outcome of the test is not motivationally relevant' to the individual.^[6] An example of a critical decision using cold cognition would be concentrating on the evidence before drawing a conclusion.

Hot and cold cognition form a dichotomy within executive functioning. Executive functioning has long been considered as a domain general cognitive function, but there has been support for separation into 'hot' affective aspects and 'cold' cognitive aspects.^[7] It is recognized that executive functioning spans across a number of cognitive tasks including working memory, cognitive flexibility and reasoning in active goal pursuit. The distinction between hot and cool cognition implies that executive function may operate differently in different contexts.^[8] The distinction has been applied to research in cognitive psychology, developmental psychology, clinical psychology, social psychology, neuropsychology, and other areas of study in psychology.

• 2Assessment
  • 2.1Hot function tasks
  • 2.2Cold function tasks

Development and neuroanatomy[edit]

Performance on hot and cold tasks improves most rapidly during the preschool years,^[8] but continues into adolescence. This co-occurs with both structural and functional development associated with the prefrontal cortex.^[9] Specific areas within the PFC are thought to be associated with both hot and cold cognition. Hot cognition is likely to be utilized during tasks that require the regulation of emotion or motivation, as well as reevaluating the motivational significance of a stimulus. The ventral and medial areas of the prefrontal cortex (VM-PFC) are implicated during these tasks. Cold cognition is thought to be associated with executive functions elicited by abstract, deconceptualized tasks, such as card sorting. The area of the brain that is utilized for these tasks is the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DL-PFC). It is between the ages of 3 years and 5 years that the most significant change in task completion is seen.^[7] Age-related trends have been observed in tasks used to measure hot cognition, as well as cold cognition.^[8] However, the age at which children reach adult-like functioning varies. It appears as though children take longer to fully develop hot executive functioning than cold.^[10] This lends support to the idea that hot cognition may follow a separate, and perhaps delayed, developmental trajectory as opposed to cold cognition.^[11] Further research done on these neurological areas suggests there may be some plasticity during the development of both hot and cold cognition. While the preschool years are ones of extreme sensitivity to the development of prefrontal cortex, a similar period is found in the transition into adolescence.^[11] This gives rise to the idea that there may be a time window for intervention training, which would improve cognitive abilities and executive functioning in children and adolescents.

Assessment[edit]

This section explains the most common tasks that are used to measure hot and cold cognitive functioning. The cool tasks are neutrally affective and measure executive function abilities such as cognitive flexibility and working memory. In other words, there is nothing to be gained or lost by performing these tasks. The hot tasks also measure executive function, but these tasks result in emotionally significant consequences.^[8]

Hot function tasks[edit]

Iowa gambling task[edit]

In the Iowa gambling task participants are initially given $2,000 facsimile dollars and asked to win as much money as possible. They are presented with four decks of cards that represent either a gain or loss in money. One card from each deck is drawn at a time. Consistently choosing a card from the advantageous decks results in a net gain, whereas choosing from a disadvantageous deck results in a net loss. Each card from the disadvantageous deck offers a higher reward than the advantageous deck, but also a higher and more variable loss.

Delay of gratification[edit]

Studies have been conducted on the concept of delay of gratification to test whether or not people are capable of waiting to receive a reward in order to increase the value of the reward. In these experiments, participants can choose to either take the reward they are immediately presented with or can choose to wait a period of time to then receive a higher valued reward. Hot cognition would motivate people to immediately satisfy their craving for the present reward rather than waiting for a better reward.^[6]

Neutral versus negative syllogisms tasks[edit]

The influence that beliefs can have on logical reasoning may vary as a result of emotions during cognitive processes. When presented with neutral content, this will typically lead to the exhibition of the belief-bias effect. In contrast, content that is emotionally charged will result in a diminished likelihood of beliefs having an influence. The impact of negative emotions demonstrates the capability they have for altering the process underlying logical reasoning. There is an interaction that occurs between emotions and beliefs that interferes with the ability that an individual has to reason.^[12]

Cold function tasks[edit]

The cool tasks are neutrally affective and measure executive function abilities such as cognitive flexibility and working memory. In other words, there is nothing to be gained or lost by performing these tasks. The hot tasks also measure executive function, but these tasks result in emotionally significant consequences.^[8]

Self Ordered Pointing[edit]

In this task an array of items is presented to participants. The position of these items then randomly changes from trial to trial. Participants are instructed to point to one of these items, but then asked to not point to that same item again. In order to perform well on this task, participants must remember what item they pointed to and use this information to decide on subsequent responses.

Wisconsin Card Sort Task (WCST)[edit]

The Wisconsin Card Sort Task requires participants to sort stimulus cards that differ in dimensions (shape, colour, or number). However, they are not told how to sort them. The only feedback they receive is whether or not a match is correct. Participants must discover the rule according to dimension. Once the participant matches a certain number of correct cards, the dimension changes and they must rediscover the new rule. This requires participants to remember the rule they were using and cognitively change the rule by which they use to sort.

Dimensional Change Card Sort Task (DCCS)[edit]

Participants are required to sort stimulus cards based on either shape or colour. They are first instructed to sort based on one dimension (colour) in a trial, and then it switches to the other (shape) in the following trial. 'Switch' trials are also used where the participant must change back and forth between rules within a single trial. Unlike the WCST, the rule is explicitly stated and does not have to be inferred. The task measures how flexible participants are to changing rules. This requires participants to shift between dimensions of sorting.

Iowa Gambling Task Professional Manual

Recent evidence[edit]

Research has demonstrated emotional manipulations on decision making processes. Participants who are induced with enthusiasm, anger or distress (different specific emotions) responded in different ways to the risky-choice problems, demonstrating that hot cognition, as an automatic process, affects decision making differently. Another example of hot cognition is a better predictor of negative emotional arousal as compared to cold cognition when they have a personal investment, such as wanting your team to win.^[13] In addition, hot cognition changes the way people use decision-making strategies, depending on the type of mood they are in, positive or negative. When people are in a positive mood, they tend to use compensatory, holistic strategies. This leads to a shallow and broad processing of information. In a negative mood people employ non-compensatory, narrow strategies which leads to a more detail-oriented and thorough processing of information. In the study participants were shown movie clips in order to induce a mood of happiness, anger or sadness and asked to complete a decision-making task. Researchers found that participants in the negative mood condition used more non-compensatory, specific decision-making techniques by focusing on the details of the situation. Participants in the positive mood condition used more compensatory, broad decision making techniques by focusing on the bigger picture of the situation. Also, hot cognition has been implicated in automatic processing and autobiographical memory. Furthermore, hot cognition extends outside the laboratory as exhibited in political process and criminal judgments. When police officers were induced with sadness they were more likely to think the suspect was guilty.^[14] However, if police officers were induced with anger there was no difference in judgments. There are also clinical implications for understanding certain disorders. Patients diagnosed with anorexia nervosa went through intervention training, which included hot cognition as a part of emotional processing development, did not show any improvement after this training.^[12] In another clinical population, those diagnosed with bipolar disorder exaggerated their perception of negative feedback and were less likely to adjust their decision making process in the face of risky-choices (gambling tasks).^[15]

References[edit]

1. ^ ^abcBrand, A. G. (1985–1986), 'Hot cognition: Emotions and writing behavior', JAC, 6: 5–15, JSTOR20865583
2. ^Roiser JP, Sahakian BJ (2013). 'Hot and cold cognition in depression'. CNS Spectr. 18 (3): 139–49. doi:10.1017/S1092852913000072. PMID23481353.
3. ^Lodge, Milton; Taber, Charles S. (2005). 'The Automaticity of Affect for Political Leaders, Groups, and Issues: An Experimental Test of the Hot Cognition Hypothesis'. Political Psychology. 26 (3): 455–482. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9221.2005.00426.x. ISSN0162-895X.
4. ^Huijbregts, Stephan C. J.; Warren, Alison J.; Sonneville, Leo M. J.; Swaab-Barneveld, Hanna (2007). 'Hot and Cool Forms of Inhibitory Control and Externalizing Behavior in Children of Mothers who Smoked during Pregnancy: An Exploratory Study'. Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology. 36 (3): 323–333. doi:10.1007/s10802-007-9180-x. ISSN0091-0627.
5. ^Kunda, Ziva (1990). 'The case for motivated reasoning'. Psychological Bulletin. 108 (3): 480–498. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.108.3.480. ISSN0033-2909. PMID2270237.
6. ^ ^abRoiser, J.P., 'Hot and cold cognition in depression', Journal of Neuroscience Education Institute, 18 (3): 1092–8529, ISSN1092-8529
7. ^ ^abZelazo, Philip David; Mller, Ulrich (2002). 'Executive Function in Typical and Atypical Development'. Blackwell Handbook of Childhood Cognitive Development. pp. 445–469. doi:10.1002/9780470996652.ch20. ISBN9780470996652.
8. ^ ^abcdeHongwanishkul, Donaya; Happaney, Keith R.; Lee, Wendy S. C.; Zelazo, Philip David (2005). 'Assessment of Hot and Cool Executive Function in Young Children: Age-Related Changes and Individual Differences'. Developmental Neuropsychology. 28 (2): 617–644. doi:10.1207/s15326942dn2802_4. ISSN8756-5641. PMID16144430.
9. ^Diamond, Adele (2002). 'Normal Development of Prefrontal Cortex from Birth to Young Adulthood: Cognitive Functions, Anatomy, and Biochemistry'. Principles of Frontal Lobe Function. pp. 466–503. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195134971.003.0029. ISBN9780195134971.
10. ^Prencipe, Angela; Kesek, Amanda; Cohen, Julia; Lamm, Connie; Lewis, Marc D.; Zelazo, Philip David (2011). 'Development of hot and cool executive function during the transition to adolescence'. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology. 108 (3): 621–637. doi:10.1016/j.jecp.2010.09.008. ISSN0022-0965. PMID21044790.
11. ^ ^abZelazo, Philip David; Carlson, Stephanie M. (2012). 'Hot and Cool Executive Function in Childhood and Adolescence: Development and Plasticity'. Child Development Perspectives: n/a. doi:10.1111/j.1750-8606.2012.00246.x. ISSN1750-8592.
12. ^ ^abGoel, V.; Vartanian, O. (2011). 'Negative emotions can attenuate the influence of beliefs on logical reasoning'. Cognition and Emotion. 25 (1): 121–131. doi:10.1080/02699931003593942. PMID21432659.
13. ^Madrigal, R (2008). 'Hot vs. cold cognitions and consumers' reactions to sporting event outcomes'. Journal of Consumer Psychology. 18 (4): 304–319. doi:10.1016/j.jcps.2008.09.008. ISSN1057-7408.
14. ^Ask, Karl; Granhag, Pär Anders (2007). 'Hot cognition in investigative judgments: The differential influence of anger and sadness'. Law and Human Behavior. 31 (6): 537–551. doi:10.1007/s10979-006-9075-3. ISSN1573-661X.
15. ^Roiser, Jonathan P; Cannon, Dara M; Gandhi, Shilpa K; Tavares, Joana Taylor; Erickson, Kristine; Wood, Suzanne; Klaver, Jacqueline M; Clark, Luke; Zarate Jr, Carlos A; Sahakian, Barbara J; Drevets, Wayne C (2009). 'Hot and cold cognition in unmedicated depressed subjects with bipolar disorder'. Bipolar Disorders. 11 (2): 178–189. doi:10.1111/j.1399-5618.2009.00669.x. ISSN1398-5647. PMC2670985. PMID19267700.